PUBLIC INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

The dominant  Japanese pacifist political culture was being chalanged by a nationalist subculture. This potentionally impact on public opinion in China in 2005. Many issues drove the problematique relations between the Chinese and Japanese in this period. These include Japanese claims to some islands and oil reserve in South China Sea, untill Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council. At the same time, China’s economy had “helped pull the sluggish Japanese economy out of recession” as Japan’s primary export market in 2004. We might think that the anti-Japanese protest as a negotiating tool of the Chinese government in its dealings with Japanese. But the Chinese protests as public opinion and later street protest were not organized by the Chinese government. These seemed to have been genuine reflections of public opinion on Japan.

The chinese case suggest that the relationship between the public and foreign policy decision making is complicated. The chinese case also demonstrates that public opinion matters to governments, even in nondemocratic system.

There are two basic views on the relationship between public opinion and policy making. The first suggests a strong impact, this approach assumes that the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy making process (leaders follow masses). The second is denying any real impact, this view representing the conventional wisdom in the literature suggests a ‘top-down’ process, according to which popular consensus is a function of the elite consensus and cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion. The second view, then, distinguished between three different publics: mass public that is not interested in foreign policy matters, attentive public, and there is the elite.

  The linkage between public opinion and policy formation is more complex than that suggested by these earlier views. Holsti says that although American policy makers tend to be more inclined to internationalism than the American public, the policy makers are restrained by their perception of what the public will tolerate. Policy maker believe that the public is harder to convince about internationalist policies and the lack of public support could jeopardize any undertaking. Holsti concludes that there is no direct linkage between public opinion and policy information, but that policy maker’s perceptions of public opinion set the parameters for foreign policy behavior.

Does public opinion matter in nondemocracies as much as democracies? The short answer is yes. Democratic structure allow public opinion to manifest itself in different ways than do nondemocracies structure. But there is a gray area that we have to understandable when public opinion is a political resource wielded by different actors (including the public opinion itself) in different ways.

Public opinion matters to government and foreign policy even in nondemocratic states because government legitimacy derives not from elections but from the mass public’s perception of the given regime’s adherence and faithfulness to powerful transnational symbol. When we turn to democratic system, Thomas Risse Kaplan conclude that mass public has an important indirect effect as it appears that the main role of the public in liberal democracies is to influence the coalition-building process. Then, public opinion is used by elites and interest groups in establishing their claims to dominate a policy coalition.

But there is another actor that needs to be considered here beside those mentioned above – mass media. Some observers and policy makers a phenomenon called “CNN effect”. Media plays a powerful role in setting the public agenda. Once media broadcast images of mass starvation, ethnic conflict, or some other sort of mass suffering, the images arouse strong emotions in the public then turn to their elected officials and demand some strong and morally correct response.

When a foreign policy arises, someone attempts to explain the problem and its solution, that’s we called “framing”. Framing is not so easy. Framing is the act of selecting and highlighting some facets of events and issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution. Frames works best if it has cultural resonance, that is, frames that evoke words and images that are selecting noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged in the dominant political culture

In the last, we conclude that public opinion matters, but scholars seem to agree that its impact on policy making indirect. Public opinion seems to matter most when it has been filtered through either the perceptions of elite policy makers or interest groups and political party activity.  

FOREIGN POLICY

DEFINITION OF FP

It is useful to distinguish diplomacy from FP whereas diplomacy refers to the manner of conducting one’s relation, FP refers to the matter. Foreign Policy is about ‘the fundamental issue of how organized groups, at least in part strangers to each other, interrelate’(Hill 2003:xvii). Foreign policy has its origins in the presupposition that there exists a boundary between (at least) two units. However, this does not mean that they are completely isolated from each other. One’s action influences and is influenced by the other’s. That is, these units are interdependent.

Foreign policy’s objective is achieving specific goals defined in term of national interest which is tend to involve such abstract goals as self-preservation, security, national well-being, national prestige, the protection and advancement of ideology, and the pursuit of power. We can say foreign policy is for finding ways and means to preserve and promote vital interests of those organized groups (Hill 2003:3; White 2004b: 11).

FP AS COMPLEX PHENOMENON

The key problem of FP making and diplomacy is that of translating the relatively vague and general interest of a nation into concrete, precise objectives and means. Decision makers must deal with many variables in the international milieu where as the concept of national interest usually remains the most constant factor and serves as a guidepost for decision makers in the policy process. Besides that, FP actions are difficult to evaluate. First, short-range advantages or disadvantages must be weighed in relation to long-range consequences, second is their impact on other nations is difficult to evaluate, third is most policies result in a mixture of successes and failures that are hard to disentangle.

SOURCE:

-          Tezcan, Mehmet. Free Journal of University of Brussels (VUB), Department of Political Science and Institute for European Studies (IES)

Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS FROM 1993 TO THE PRESENT

 As FPA was being liberated from its inconsistencies in the late 1980s, the world was being liberated from the chess match of the Cold War. This was a felicitous coincidence for FPA and was an added source of vigor for its resource agenda. The significance of this temporal coincidence can be understood by remembering what types of IR theory were in ascendance at the time: neorealist systems structure theory and rational choice modeling.

FPA in the post-Cold War era retains the distinctive theoretical commitments that demarcated at its inception. Indeed, FPA’s ability to ask new questions is perhaps more promising in relation to its future theoretical potential than any other indicator.  

Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

FPA SELF-REFLECTION IN THE LATE 1970S AND 1980S

A period of critical self-reflection began in the late 1970s and continued until the mid-1980s in FPA. The effects were felt unevenly across FPA: it is here we see the most pruning, both theoretical and methodological, which will be discussed in the moment. In decision making studies there was a period of rather slow growth due to methodological considerations. The information requirements to conduct a high quality group or bureaucratic analysis of a foreign policy choice are tremendous. If one were not part of the group or bureaucracy in question, detailed accounts of what transpired, preferably from a variety of primary source view-points, would be necessary.

FPA work at the psychological level actually expanded during the time period but work at the societal level arguably contracted on some research fronts. The reason for this bifurcation in the genotype was a methodological one: psychology provided ready-made and effective tools for the study of political psychology; political science did not over the foreign policy analyst the same advantage. 

Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

THE FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The first generation of foreign policy analysis started in 1954 to 1973. Great strides in conceptualization along with parallel efforts in data collection and methodological experimentation were the contribution of this time period. The second generation of work from about 1974 to 1993 expressly built upon those foundations. Though it is always difficult to set the boundaries of a field of thoughts, the overview that follows includes a representative sampling of classic works in the first and second generation that both examined how the “specifics” of nations lead the differences in foreign policy choice/behavior and put forward proposition in this regard that at least have the potential to be generalized and applicable cross-nationally.

The first period also saw the emergence of a strong research agenda that examined the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics on foreign policy decision making. First period research showed how “rational” foreign policy making can be depended by the attempt to work with and through large, organized governmental groups.

Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis

“INITIAL” GENERATION

It is not true that Foreign Policy Analysis is impossible as theoretical task. And that is not that state-centered IR theory and FPA cannot be impossible, for one of the consequences of this would be that IR could not exist as a field of social science scholarship. Then FPA offers a real grounding of theory of IR, which provides real value in IR theorizing.

            The most important thing about studying FPA in IR theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of state behavior, material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision makers. That makes if in IR theory contains no human beings, they will erroneously paint for us a world of no change. And also adding human of decision makers as the key of theoretical intersection confers some advantages generally lacking in IR theory.

            The origin of the FPA in some sense has been around as long as there have been historians and other who have made the choices they did regarding interstate relations. This analysis work within the field of international relations is best dated back to the late 1950s and early 1960.

            Some scholars who works arguably built the foundation of Foreign Policy Analysis are James Rosenau, Richard C. Snyder, Burton Sapin, Margaret Sprout, etc. Snyder write in his book that decisions makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers. And he also said that decision-making was best viewed as “organizational behavior”.

            And in James Rosenau’s pre-theorizing said about nation state behavior, to identify factors is not trace their influence. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other.

            The message of the powerful works in its appeal to certain scholars is the particularities of the human beings making national foreign policy were vitally important to understanding foreign policy choice.

            

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

            It is not true that Foreign Policy Analysis is impossible as theoretical task. And that is not that state-centered IR theory and FPA cannot be impossible, for one of the consequences of this would be that IR could not exist as a field of social science scholarship. Then FPA offers a real grounding of theory of IR, which provides real value in IR theorizing.

            The most important thing about studying FPA in IR theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of state behavior, material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decisionmakers. That makes if in IR theory contains no human beings, they will erroneously paint for us a world of no change. And also adding human of decisionmakers as the key of theoretical intersection confers some advantages generally lacking in IR theory.

            The origins of the FPA in some sense has been around as long as there have been historians and other who have made the choices they did regarding interstate relations. This analysis work within the field of international relations is best dated back to the late 1950s and early 1960.

            Some scholars who works arguably built the foundation of Foreign Policy Analysis are James Rosenau, Richard C. Snyder, Burton Sapin, Margaret Sprout, etc. Snyder write in his book that decisions makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers. And he also said that decision-making was best viewed as “organizational behavior”.

            And in James Rosenau’s pre-theorizing said about nation state behavior, to identify factors is not trace their influence. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other.

            The message of the powerful works in its appeal to certain scholars is the particularities of the human beings making national foreign policy were vitally important to understanding foreign policy choice.

            

THE INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKER: THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WORLD LEADERS

            When and which the leader matter? Under what conditions might it be more fruitful to examine leader characteristics? A variety of hypotheses come to mind...

1.      Different regimes types offer different levels of constraint on leader control of policy.

2.      Whether a leader is interested in FP or not. Leader uninterested in FP may delegate a large measure of authority to subordinates, in which case it would be vital to identify and examine their characteristics as well.

3.      Crisis situations will invariably be handled at the highest levels of government power, and almost by definition top leaders will be involved regardless of their general level of interest in foreign affair.

4.      When advisors are unable to “read” a situation because information is sparse or contradictiory, a leader  may be called upon to exercise his or her judgement so that a basis for FP decision making is laid.

5.      The degree of the leader has had diplomatic training (Margaret Hermann, 1984). The leader with prior training have learned to subordinate their personal characteristics to the diplomatic requirement of situation at hand.

6.      Expertise in a particular issue are or region of the world may also signal that a particular leadr, even if he is not the top leader, may leave a personal imprint on the policy eventually chosen.

7.       Style of leadership: does the leader like to delegate information processing and decision task or prefer to sort through the intelligence himself/ herself, providing a much more hands-on style of leadership?

8.      Groups, whether small/ large, tend to evolve into contexts in which particular individuals play a given role on a fairly consistent basis.

Research was conducted on “cognitive constraints”, including cognitive bias, heuristic error, the motivation of leaders, cognitive maps, scripts and schemas, cognitive style, and the life experience of decision makers. The following diagram outlines the key concepts that we will be exploring in this chapter:

Increasing attention was directed to the mind of the foreign policy decision-maker.  The societal context in which the decision-maker operates is shaped by several factors such as culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, and demographics.  Within this societal context, the individual mind is unique in its own personal beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions.  To better understand foreign policy, researchers directed their attention to the socio-psychological context of the decision-maker.

a.      Individual Characteristics

Political psychology was employed to understand the personal characteristics of the decision-maker.  Under certain stressful conditions these individual characteristics would become crucial in understanding foreign policy decisions.  Efforts were made to categorize decision-makers according to their foreign policy dispositions.

In addition, the role of perceptions and images in foreign policy was also an important research agenda during this time.  Misperception in foreign policy situations could have grave consequences, and was furnished by the rampant use of stereotypical images with reference to the 'enemy'.

Research was conducted on 'cognitive constraints', including cognitive bias, heuristic error, the motivation of leaders, cognitive maps, scripts, and schemas, cognitive style, and the life experience of decision makers. 

b.      National and Societal Characteristics

The decision-maker's perception of its nation's 'role' in the international arena began to be studied.  Once a 'national role conception' was perceived, decision-makers could make their decisions to fit according to the conceptual mould.

In addition, the study of culture as an independent variable affecting foreign policy came to the forefront; analysts considered that the very process of policymaking might be stamped by one's cultural heritage and socialisation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, FPA asserts that leaders do matter and that analysis of perception, cognition, and personality of world leaders is well worth undertaking. In addition, FPA draws upon a wide variety of techniques to make such an analysis possible, despite the unavailability of world leaders for direct observation. That’s all...

THE GREAT DEBATES

1.      The First Debate (1920-1930)

Utopian (liberalism) vs. Realism

It talked about ontology[i], the essential of the study of IR.

Liberal International Relations Theory arose after WW I in response to the inability of states to control and limit war in their international relations. Early adherents include Woodrow Wilson and Norman Angell who argued vigorously that states mutually gained from cooperation and that war was so destructive to essentially futile. It’s supported by W. Wilson as the president of USA that day.

The conception of Utopian is a man endowed with reason by nature; his actions are governed by norms and ideals founded in reason and therefore intelligible. It means that man is throwing into the contradiction of norm and reality. This situation instills fear; fear is countered by effort to achieve security by means of the acquisition, demonstration, and argumentation of power (over others).

Unlike realism, it focuses on state security and power above all else. Early realist such as E. H. Carr, Daniel Bernhard, and Hans Morgenthau argued that state is self-interested, power-seeking[ii] rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances of survival, balance of power (BOP) [iii].

Termination:

-          US Senate refused to allow the US to join and at first the original members refused to allow Germany or indeed Russia to become members. W. Wilson failed to sell his ideas.

-          1930s saw economic collapse (colonialism and imperialism).

-          Rise of dictators in various countries.

-          From 1839 to 1878 the international system was afflicted by 19 wars (William K. Domke: War and the Changing Global System, Yale U. P 1988).

Achievement: Utopian’s achievement is PBB, but all the failure caused liberalism led realist dominance following WW II.

2.      The Second Debate (1950-1970)

Traditionalism vs. Behaviorism (scientism)

It talked about methodology[i], how to learn IR?

Traditionalism: politics is a specific social form of action full off sense and values; an art which can be learned on the basis of the historical examples. Historical and social phenomena can be clearly distinguished from natural phenomena; thus, they are not susceptible to scientific explanations.

Behaviorism (scientism): they advise to those who govern and political education of those who are govern and political education of those who are governed; evaluating comments, norm-based opinions, and recommendations; for action regarding present political decisions on the basis of respective scientific research results.

Termination:

The real problem of the second debate was striving for an ‘understanding’ of politics on the insight into and of knowledge of historical-social developments and process.

Finally, there is no winner on this debate.

3.      The Third Debate (1980-now)

Neorealism + Neoliberalism vs. Neomarxis

It talked about axiology[ii], how to use IR as science in the field.

Background: linguistic turn in IR; Cold War

Neorealism/ structural realism is a theory of international relations, outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book “Theory of international Politics”. Waltz argues in favor of a systemic approach: the international structure acts as a constraint on state behavior, so that only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range survive. Unlike realism’s (anthropological: man as a security and power-seeking agent), the foundation premises of neorealism is structural: anarchy of the international system. Neorealism developed largely within the American political science tradition, seeks to reformulate the classical realist tradition of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr into a rigorous and positivic social science.

Neoliberalism is a response to neorealism; while not denying the anarchic nature of the international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated. Neoliberalism argues that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can be emerge through the building of norms, regimes, and institutions.

Both theories, however, consider ‘the state and its interest’ as the central subject of analysis. Neoliberalism may have a wider conception of what those interests are.

Marx believed that the identity of a social class is derived from its relationship to the means of production (as opposed to the nation that class is determined by wealth alone).  Marx describes several social classes in capitalist societies, including primarily:

-          The proletariat (those individuals who sell their labor power and who, in the capitalist mode of production, do not own the means of production). According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production established the condition that enables the bourgeoisie to exploit the proletariat due to the fact that the workers’ labor power generates a surplus value greater than the workers’ wages.

-          The bourgeoisie (those individuals who own the means of production and buy labor power from the proletariat, thus exploiting the proletariat).

Termination:

-          Individualist disagrees with the basic approach of Neomarxism that of viewing all people acting under the influence of socio-economic forces and instead focus on the differences and unpredictable actions of individuals.

-          In the other hand, neomarxism critics neoliberalism and neorealism.

1.      They (neoliberalism and neorealism) need not to synthesize their ideologies.

2.      Their ideologies are too luxurious.

3.      They supposed to talk about nations of the third world.

Finally, no one won the debate.

4.      The Fourth Debate (1980 until now)

Positivism vs. post-positivism

It talked about classic science and the freedom of thought.

Positivism is the philosophy that the only authentic knowledge is knowledge that is based on actual sense experience. Ex: realism, liberalism, Marxism, rationalism (reflection theories).

Post-positivism or also known as empiricism or is a metatheoretical stance following positivism. One of the main supporters of post positivism are John Dewey and Nicholas Rescher. It is a stance that recognizes most of criticisms that have been raised against traditional-logical positivism and similar foundational. Ex: critical theory, post modernism, feminism[iii], environmentalism, peace studies, etc (mainstream perspective).

Termination: there is no termination yet

MY OPINION

I think that there are so many problems with the conventional story about IR. Some of the more recent work on history of IR of the field are nothing more than myths. In my opinion in order for the investigation of history of field to receive the same intellectual respect as other areas of research, more attention should be placed on theoretical and methodological assumption. The absence of such attention in much of the existing literature on the history of the IR’s field had served to reinforce the history of IR is self-evident.

REFERENCES:

-          Schmidt, Brian C. 2002. On the History and Historiography of International Relation. “Handbook of International Relations”. London: Sage Publication Ltd

-          Fearon, James & Wendt, Alexander. 2003. Rationalism vs. Constructivism: Skeptical View. Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publication Ltd

-          University of Airlangga Roadmap

-          Angel, Norman. 1909. The Great Illusion. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons

-          http://dictionary.com (diakses tahun 2008)

-          http://hfienberg.com/irtheory/neorealism (diakses tahun 2008)

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[i] Methodology is a set of system/ methods, principle and rules for regulating a given discipline, as in the arts of science.

[ii] Axiology is the branch of philosophy, dealing with values as those ethnics, aesthetics, or religion.

[iii] Feminism in international relations is a broad term given to work of those scholars who have sought to bring gender concern into the academic study of international politics. However, it would be a mistake to think that feminist IR was solely a matter of identifying how many groups of women are positioned n the international politic system. From its inception, feminist IR has always shown a strong concern with thinking about men, and in particular, masculinities. Indeed, many IR feminist argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature.

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[i] Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that studies the nature of existence or being that such.

[ii] The concept of ‘power in international relations’ can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in the international affairs. It is often divided up into the concept of hard power and soft power. Hard power is relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force. Soft power is commonly covering economics, diplomacy, and cultural influence. However, there’s no clear dividing line between the two forms of power.

[iii] BOP exists when there is parity/ stability between competing forces. It expresses the doctrine intended to prevent anyone nation from becoming sufficiently strong so as to enable it to enforce it will upon the rest.

ON HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF INTERATIONAL RELATIONS

The history of international relations is often traced back the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, where the modern state system was developed. Westphalia encouraged the rise of the independent nation state, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during Cold War. However, this somewhat over-simplified.

IR AS AN ART

International Relations as an art occur when a nation make a relationship with the other nations. For instance when a nations decide to work together in trading or military with the others.

One of the most significant problems in work on the history of IR is that these histories have failed to address question, how one should write the history of IR in the field? Describing the history of IR as if a complete consensus existed on the essential dimension of the field’s evolution is not easy at all, the absence of any significant controversy concern “how the field has developed” must be devoted. That’s why nobody knows “when or where” international relation began at the first time. But all of we knew that the achievement of the art of IR that a nation successfully fulfill its nation interest by its relationship with the other nations.

IR AS A SCIENCE

IR as a science is when we learn IR as a discipline study or science.

Initially, international relations as a distinct field of study (science) were almost entirely British-centered. In 1919, the Chair in International Politics establishment at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (in 2008, renamed Aberystwyth University) from an endowment given by David Davies, became the first academic position dedicated to IR.

In the early 1920’s, the London School of Economics’ department of IR was founded at the behest of Nobel Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker. That is the defining moment of IR as a science.

There is a strong conviction that significant development in international politics (such as: war) shaped the development of IR as a science. It is characteristically as a reaction of World War I.

REFERENCES:

-          Schmidt, Brian C. 2002. On the History and Historiography of International Relation. “Handbook of International Relations”. London: Sage Publication Ltd

-          Fearon, James & Wendt, Alexander. 2003. Rationalism vs. Constructivism: Skeptical View. Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publication Ltd

-          University of Airlangga Roadmap

-          Angel, Norman. 1909. The Great Illusion. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons

-          http://dictionary.com (diakses tahun 2008)

-          http://hfienberg.com/irtheory/neorealism (diakses tahun 2008)

INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 1900-1945: the globalization of world politics

The first WW left many European states economically ruined, and with political structure weakened. Indeed, a number of empires based in Europe collapse during the war – those of Austro – Hungary, Turkey, and Tsarist Russia. This consequence of the war was initially masked by the optimism of the American economy.

Japan, in 1930s, was embarking on a search for territory in China and beyond. And Treaty of Versailles encouraged extremist political movements, most notably facism in Italy (and Spain) and Nazism in Germany.

The Second WW had profound global consequences. The war profoundly affected the map of Europe. Then, the first half of the last century should seem overwhelmingly fragmented and fissiparous.

OPINION

War always makes a big pain, incising deeply pain in everyone. It needs a very long time to be healed. I think that the world has need of mutual understanding, through cooperation and communication, that we can abolish war and engender war.

REFERENCES:

            The Globalization of World Politics 2^nd ed: an introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith

            Sagan, Scoot D. 1914. Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability (1986)

            Van Euera, Stephen. The Gulf of the Offensive and the Origin of the first WW. Summer 1984 p. 62

            www.greenwood.org 

THE ORIGIN OF WORLD WAR TWO IN ASIA AND THE PASIFIC

The Pacific War was the part of WW II and preceding conflicts that took place in the Pacific Ocean, its land, and in East Asia, between July 7, 1937, and August 14, 1945. The most decisive actions took place after the Empire of Japan attacked various countries, who together came to be known as the Allies (for Allied Powers).

CONFLICT BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

From 1868 onward, Japan underwent a rapid period of industrialization and modernization, with profound social, economic, and political consequences. To find new markets, raw materials and land for Japan’s growing population, Japan began to expand into northern China, while China was a protected state of civil war.

Between 1931 and 1933, Japan consolidated its hold over Manchuria, establishing a puppet state, Manchuguo. The League Nations’ response to the most obvious act of aggression it had thus far faced was minimal. And in 1937, Japan was at war with China, which caused worsening relations with the US-ultimately leading to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WW

The origins of the Second WW have been the subject of particular historiographical controversy. Historians still dispute how far Hittler planned the war actually and how ambition Nazi territorial expansionism actually was.

REFERENCES:

            The Globalization of World Politics 2^nd ed: an introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith

            Sagan, Scoot D. 1914. Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability (1986)

            Van Euera, Stephen. The Gulf of the Offensive and the Origin of the first WW. Summer 1984 p. 62

            www.greenwood.org 

THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SLUMP, 1928-1933

It was a wide economic downtown. It was the largest and most important economic depression in modern history and used in the 21^st century as a benchmark how far the world’s economy can fall.

The Great Depression originated in the US. Historians most often use as a starting date the stock market crash on October 29, 1929, known as Black Tuesday.

Depressions in many countries around the world resulted in extremist political movement gaining strength, many of which were of an extreme right-wing nature. The end depression in the US is associated with the onset of the war economy of WW II, beginning around 1939.

REFERENCES:

            The Globalization of World Politics 2^nd ed: an introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith

            Sagan, Scoot D. 1914. Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability (1986)

            Van Euera, Stephen. The Gulf of the Offensive and the Origin of the first WW. Summer 1984 p. 62

            www.greenwood.org 

GERMANY, ‘WAR GUILT’ AND ‘REPARATIONS’

Germany was found ‘guilty’ of having begun the war. Germany lost land to Poland. Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France. Germany was to be disarmed, with France occupying the Rhineland as a security zone and reparations were to be repaid to the victorious powers.

Many critics found fault with the settlement, either because it was too hard, or not hard enough, on Germany.

REFERENCES:

            The Globalization of World Politics 2^nd ed: an introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith

            Sagan, Scoot D. 1914. Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability (1986)

            Van Euera, Stephen. The Gulf of the Offensive and the Origin of the first WW. Summer 1984 p. 62

            www.greenwood.org 

PRESIDENT WILSON’S “FOURTEEN POINTS” AND SELF- DETERMINATION

A summary of Wilson’s “Fourteen points”:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at international diplomacy to be carried on publicity
2. Absolute freedom of navigation on the seas
3. The removal of all economic barriers
4. Disarmament undertaken and guaranteed by states to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
5. A free, open minded and impartial adjustment of all colonial claims.
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and settlement of questions affecting Russia
7. Belgium must be evacuated an restored
8. French territory to be evacuated and restored and Alsace-Lorraine to be returned to French rule.
9. Italian frontiers to be adjusted a long clearly recognizable line of nationality.
10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary to be given the opportunity for autonoms development.
11. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro to be evacuated. Serbia to be given access to the sea and international guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of the Balkan state to be made.
12. The Turkish portions of the ottoman empire to be assured a secure sovereignty
13. An independent Polish state to be established
14. A general association of nations to be formed to afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to all states.

Wilson believed that the avoidance of war could be furthered by creating an international organization, based on the principle of ‘collective security’. His scheme for a League of Nations was premised on the ‘peace-loving’ member states regarding any threat to the international peace as an act of aggression which ultimately threatened them all.

Wilson was an opponent of imperialism and believed passionately in the right of distinct national groups to govern themselves by being accorded sovereignty over their own territory. However, in practice, the nationalities of those parts of Europe where empire had recently crumbled – especially the Balkans and the central and Eastern Europe – were not neatly parceled into distinct territorial areas. The peacemaker therefore faced a difficult task of drawing the boundaries of the new states of Europe, some of which had never existed before. The new states in Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe not only had to contend with ethnic cleavages but also with weak economies and fledging political institutions.

REFERENCES:

            The Globalization of World Politics 2^nd ed: an introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith

            Sagan, Scoot D. 1914. Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability (1986)

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            www.greenwood.org